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CONCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
H. PARKER SHARP*
I.
EXECUTIVE JUSTICE
Administrative Determination of Rights. The increase in
litigation which has accompanied the growth of this country
since the close of the Civil War would have resulted in an intol-
erable burden on the federal courts if Congress had not adopted
the system of administrative determination of rights which is
aptly referred to as executive justice. Many people now have
no contact with the courts in certain kinds of disputes. Instead,
their rights are determined by administrative officials having
jurisdiction of the particular question raised.1
Court Review Only if Administrative Remedies Exhausted.
The federal courts ordinarily will not review an administrative
decision of a question of fact unless all administrative remedies
have been exhausted.2 Their attitude is clearly shown by the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States v.
Sing Tuck.3 It appeared from the statement of facts in this
case that an immigration inspector had decided against the right
of Sing Tuck to enter this country. Although he was informed
by the inspector of his right to appeal to the Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor, Sing Tuck did not appeal. Instead, he sought
to be discharged from the custody of the immigration inspector
by means of a habeas corpus proceeding in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Northern District of New York. The
*See page 577 for biographical note.
1 While this article deals with the finality of administrative decisions
concerning the right to use the mails and the right to enter, or remain in,
this country, the general piinciples developed apply to decisions of all
administrative officials of the national government whose decisions on any
particular question have been made final by acts of Congress.
2 United States ex rel. Cubyluci v. Bell, 248 Fed. 995 (E. D. N. Y.
1917); Ex parte Tinkoff, 254 Fed. 222 (N. D. Ill. 1918); Napore v. Rowe,
256 Fed. 832 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919); United States ex rel. Grau v. Uhl, 262
Fed. 532 (S. D. N. Y. 1919). Contra, Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745
(C. C. A. 8th, 1915). This rule does not apply to administrative decisions
of questions of law. Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1 (1904); Ex partf
Koerner, 176 Fed. 478 (C. 0. E. Dw Wash., 1909).
3 194 U. S. 161 (1904).
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decision of the Circuit Court upholding the detention of Sing
Tuck for deportation was reversed by the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals on the ground that he was entitled to a judicial investiga-
tion of his claim of American citizenship. The United States
obtained a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court and the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was reversed. Mr.
Justice Holmes in delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
"The attempt to disregard and override the provisions of the statutes
and the rules of the department and to swamp the courts by a resort to
them in the first instance must fail. * * * Before the courts can be
called upon, the preliminary sifting process provided by the statutes must
be gone through * * *." (170.)
Judicial Relief from Administrative Decisions Limited. Even
when a question of fact is involved and all administrative rem-
edies have been exhausted or when the question is one of law,
4
a person can obtain judicial relief from an administrative deci-
sion only under certain circumstances. In the following pages
an effort has been made to set forth when administrative deci-
sions concerning the right to use the mails and the right to
enter, or to stay in, this country will be treated by the federal
courts as conclusive.
II
DEPRIVATION OF THE USE OF THE MAILS
Exclusion of Obscene and Libelous Matter. The first limitation
on the use of the mails was made in 1865 when Congress passed
an act forbidding the admission of any obscene publication into
the mails of the United States.5 It is now provided by Section
211 of the United States Criminal Code that obscene and indecent
books, pictures, and letters are nonmailable matter which shall
not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or
by any letter carriers. 6 The term, "indecent," is defined in this
section as including matter of a character tending to incite arson,
murder, or assassination. 7 In Section 212 of the Criminal Code
all matter on the outside of which is found anything that is
obscene or libelous is declared to be nonmailable and the Post-
4 See page 1, note 2.
5 13 Stat. 507 (1866), Sec. 16.
6 35 Stat. 1129 (1909), Sec. 211, 18 U. S. C. (1926), Sec. 334.
7 36 Stat. 1339 (1911), Sec. 2, 18 U. S. C. (1926), Sec. 334.
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master General is authorized to prescribe regulations for with-
drawing such matter from the mails."
Decision of Postmaster General on Questions of Law Upheld
as Reasonable. In the few cases in which the decisions of the
Postmaster General that matter was nonmailable under these
provisions of the Criminal Code have been attacked the courts
have refused to interfere.9 Since the facts were undisputed in
each of these cases, whether the matter sought to be mailed fell
within the prohibitions of the statute involved was a question
of law.10 The courts accepted the decision of the Postmaster
General on the question of law in each case because there was a
reasonable foundation for the decision.
Exclusion of Matter Connected with Lotteries. Section 213
of the United States Criminal Code makes everything connected
in any way with lotteries or gift enterprises nonmailable. 1 1
Whether a particular enterprise as to which the facts are ad-
mitted falls within the prohibitions of the statute is, as pointed
out above, a question of law. The decisions by the Postmaster
General on this question of law have been rejected by the courts
in the three cases in which they have been attacked. 12 In the
case of Post Publishing Company v. Murray, it appeared that
"The Boston Post" had advertised that pictures of fifty women
would be taken in the Boston shopping district and would be
printed in the Sunday issue of the paper with the heads missing.
A five dollar gold piece was promised to each woman who could
identify her picture at the newspaper office on the following day.
The issues of the paper in which this advertisement appeared
were ordered by the Postmaster General to be excluded from
the mails on the ground that the scheme was a lottery. The
District Court of the United States for the District of Massachu-
setts agreed with the decision of the Postmaster General, but
the Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the enforcement of the
exclusion order on the ground that the advertising scheme did
835 Stat. 1129 (1909), Sec. 212, 18 U. S. C. (1926), Sec. 335.
9Davis v. Brown, 103 Fed. 909 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1900); Anderson v.
Patten, 247 Fed. 382 (S. D. N. Y., 1917) ; Burleson v. United States ex rel.
Workingmen's Co-Op. Pub. Ass'n, 274 Fed. 749 (C. A. D. C., 1921).
10 See American School of Magnetic Healing v. MeAnnulty, 187 U. S.
94, 109 (1902).
11 35 Stat. 1129 (1909), Sec. 213, 18 U. S. C. (1926), Sec. 336.
12 Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, 181 Fed. 579 (C. C. E. D. N. Y.,
1910); Eastman v. Armstrong-Byrd Music Co., 212 Fed. 662 (C. C. A. 8th,
1914); Post Publishing Co. v. Murray, 230 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 1st, 1916).
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not fall within the prohibitions of the statute. The Circuit Court
of Appeals said that as the statute involved was a highly penal
one it was not susceptible of a liberal interpretation that would
bring within its prohibitions publications not clearly within its
terms.13 The advertising schemes in the other two cases men-
tioned above were as unobjectionable as the one just discussed.
Irrespective of whether the rule of strict construction applicable
in criminal cases should be applied in these civil cases dealing
with the exclusion of matter from the mails because the provi-
sions are part of a criminal statute,14 one has a feeling that the
Postmaster General went too far in condemning the novel adver-
tising schemes involved in these cases and that the courts were
perfectly justified in rejecting his decisions as an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute.
Fraud Orders. The bulk of the litigation over the action of
the Postmaster General in denying the use of the mails has
come from the issuance of fraud orders. Under Sections 259
and 732 of Title 39 of the United States Code15 the Postmaster
General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person
or company is engaged in conducting a lottery or gift enterprise
or any scheme for obtaining money or property through the
mails by means of fraudulent representations, order the local
postmaster not to deliver any mail and not to pay any money
orders to such person or company or to the agent of such person
or company. Section 259 requires that the word, "Fraudulent,"
be stamped on all mail addressed to those engaged in the activ-
ities denounced by that section and that the mail be returned to
the sender under such regulations as the Postmaster General
shall prescribe Under Section 732 the Postmaster General is
authorized to provide regulations for the return to the remitters
of all sums represented by money orders payable to those engaged
in the forbidden enterprise. The orders issued by the Post-
master General to enforce these provisions are known as fraud
orders.' ; It will be noted that fraud orders prevent the delivery
of mail which has been conveyed to the post office from which
mail for the addressee is delivered, whereas the exclusion provi-
's 230 Fed. 776.
'4 See Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24, 37 (C. C. A. 2d,
1917).
1528 Stat. 964 (1895), Sec. 4 and 26 Stat. 466 (1891), Sec. 3.
16 Fraud orders are set out at length in American School of Magnetic
Healing v. MeAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 98-99 (1902), and in Hurley v. Dolan,
297 Fed. 825, 825-826 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924).
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sions discussed at the beginning of this section prevent the re-
ceipt at or transportation from the post office where the sender
lives of forbidden matter.
First Class Mail Not Subject to Search. In the statutes just
referred to as authorizing the issuance of fraud orders it is
specifically provided that nothing in those statutes shall be con-
strued as authorizing any person to open any letter not addressed
to himself. It was said in Ex parte Jackson 17 that the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States would pre-
vent Congress from adopting any law permitting the search of
sealed mail by the postal officials without a warrant. Congress
has never passed a law authorizing the use of search warrants
for the search of sealed mail' s for violations of the postal laws
and it has been held that search warrants cannot be issued in
the absence of statutory authority.19
Sources of Information for Fraud Orders. Since first-class
mail cannot be searched, the Postmaster General must rely on
other sources of information for the issuance of fraud orders.
The most general source is complaints by persons who feel that
they have been cheated by fraudulent schemes perpetrated
through the mails. Another source of information is advertise-
ments.
Opportunity for Hearing Required Before Fraud Order Is
Issued. The Postmaster General is authorized to issue a fraud
order upon evidence satisfactory to himself2 0 that the mails are
being used for a forbidden enterprise. It was said in the case of
People's United States Bank v. Gilson2l that a fraud order can
be issued without any opportunity to be heard being given to
the person against whom it is directed, but the federal courts
would certainly hold that any one whose rights are prejudiced by
17 96 U. S. 727, 733 (1877).
18 Congress has authorized the Postmaster General to prescribe the man-
ner of wrapping all packages of matter not charged with first-class postage,
so that the contents of such packages may be easily examined. 20 Stat.
361 (1879), Sec. 24, 39 U. S. C. (1926), Sec. 250.
19 United States v. Jones, 230 Fed. 262 (N. D. N. Y., 1916).
20 Although the statutes state that the Postmaster General shall issue
fraud orders upon evidence satisfactory to him, it is, of course, impossible
for him to act personally in the multitude of cases that must be decided.
It is enough if he acts upon the recommendations of his duly authorized
assistants. See People's United States Bank v. Gilson, note 2, infra, at
page 5; Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman, 152 Fed. 787, 791 (C. C. E. D. Mo.,
1907).
21 140 Fed. 1, 7 (C. C. E. D. Mo., 1905).
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the lack of a fair hearing cannot consistently with the require-
ment of due process of law be deprived of the use of the mails. 22
Issuance of Fraud Order Sustained. When the issuance of a
fraud order is based upon a decision by the Postmaster General
of a question of law, his decision will stand unless it is palpably
wrong.2 3 If the decision of the Postmaster General on a point
of law is wrong, but there is legal authority for his action on
another ground, the courts will also refuse to interfere.
24
The decision by the Postmaster General of a question of fact 25
is final if it has been reached after an opportunity for a fair
hearing has been given and if there is some substantial evi-
dence to support it.26 The courts have no jurisdiction to disturb
the finding of the Postmaster General under these circumstances.
Fraud Order May Prevent Delivery of Proper Mail. A fraud
order is not invalid because it prevents the delivery of mail not
connected with the forbidden enterprise against which the order
has been aimed. It has already been pointed out that the postal
officials are prohibited under the Fourth Amendment from
searching first-class mail without a warrant.2 7 Even if there
were authority for the issuance of a warrant for this purpose,
the use of search warrants to determine whether mail addressed
to a person conducting a fraudulent enterprise is connected with
that enterprise would be wholly impracticable. The only way to
enforce the law under these circumstances is to prohibit the
deliverk of all mail to the defrauder. This method of enforce-
ment has been held proper.28
Fraud Order Effective Until Forbidden Enterprise Abandoned.
When a fraud order has been issued, it is effective until the
22 See Donnell Mfg. Co. v. Wyman, 156 Fed. 415, 416 (C. C. E. D. Mo.,
1907); Aycock v. O'Brien, 28 F. (2nd) 817, 817 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
23 Enterprise Savings Ass'n v. Zumstein, 64 Fed. 837 (C. C. S. D. Ohio,
1894), affirmea in 67 Fed. 1000 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895); New v. Tribond Sales
Corporation, 19 F. (2d) 671 (C. A. D. C., 1927). Cf. Bates & Guild Co. v.
Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1904); Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53 (1912).
'!4 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904).
25 The Postmaster General has no authority to issue a fraud order in
cases in which his decision must necessarily be based on his own opinion
rather than on proof of fraud in fact. American School of Magnetic Heal-
ing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1902).
26 Missouri Drug Company v. Wyman, 129 Fed. 623 (C. C. E. D., Mo.,
1904); Putnam v. Morgan, 172 Fed. 450 (C. C. S. C. N. Y., 1909); Leach
v. Carlisle, 258 U. S. 138 (1922); Aycock v. O'Brien, 28 F. (2d) 817 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1928).
27 Page 8, supra.
28 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904).
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Postmaster General is convinced that the person against whom
the order was issued is no longer desirous of using the mails for
the prohibited purpose.29
III
EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION
Statutory Provisions. Section 136 of Title 8 of the United
States Code 30 provides that imbeciles, diseased persons, crimi-
nals, polygamists, prostitutes, contract laborers, persons likely
to become a public charge, Asiatics, with certain exceptions, and
illiterates shall be excluded from admission into the United
States. And Section 153 of Title 8 declares that in every case in
which an alien is excluded from admission into the United States
"the decision of a board of special inquiry 3' adverse to the admis-
sion of such alien shall be final,82 unless reversed on appeal to
the Secretary of Labor, '3 3 Section 155 of Title 8 of the United
States Code provides for the deportation of all aliens who within
five years after entry are found to have belonged at the time of
entry to a class excluded by law and of all aliens who at any time
advocate anarchy or assassination of public officials or who in-
dulge in or benefit from prostitution.34 This section makes the
decision of the Secretary of Labor final in every case in which a
person is ordered deported from the United States.
29 New Orleans National Bank v. Merchant, 18 Fed. 841 (C. C. E. D.
La., 1884). Cf. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407
(1921).
3039 Stat. 875 (1917), Sec. 3.
31 These boards, consisting of three members, are appointed by the
commissioner of immigration or the inspector in charge at the various
ports of arrival to pass on the case of every alien who does not appear to
the examining inspector to be clearly entitled to land. 39 Stat. 885 (1917),
Sec. 16, and 39 Stat. 887 (1917), Sec. 17, 8 U. S. C. Sections 152 and 153.
32 The statute does not make final under any circumstances an adminis-
trative decision admitting a person to this country. Li Sing v. United
States, 180 U. S. 486 (1901); Lew Quen Wo v. United States, 184 Fed.
685 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911). Contra, United States ex rel. Yee Loy Gee V.
Pierce, 289 Fed. 233 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
33 39 Stat. 887 (1917), Sec. 17. Appeals are passed on by the Board
of Review in the Department of Labor and the decisions of this board are
usually accepted by the Secretary of Labor. This mode of disposing of
appeals is not a violation of the statute. Soo Hoo Doo Hon v. Johnson, 281
Fed. 870 (D. Mass., 1922).
34 39 Stat. 889 (1917), Sec. 19.
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When Administrative Exclusion Order Is Final. No part of
the system of executive justice has been more vigorously and
consistently attacked than this which permits administrative
officials to decide as to the right of persons to enter, or stay in,
this country. The first attempt in the Supreme Court of the
United States to invalidate this kind of administrative decision
was in the case of Nishimura Ekiu v. United States in 1892.85
Nishimura Ekiu, a Japanese woman, was denied admission by
the immigration officials at San Francisco on the ground that she
was likely to become a public charge. Thereupon, she applied
to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Dis-
trict of California for a writ of habeas corpus, offering to intro-
duce evidence of her right to land and alleging that the Act of
March 3, 1891,36 was unconstitutional because it deprived her
of her liberty without due process of law if it vested exclusive
authority to determine that right in executive officers. From
the order of the Circuit Court denying the writ an appeal was
taken. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court affirming
the order of the Circuit Court, Mr. Justice Gray said:
"The final determination of those facts (on which the right to land
depends) may be entrusted by Congress to executive officers; and in such
a case, as in all others, in which a statute gives a discretionary power to
an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he
is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and
no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at lib-
erty to redxamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he
acted." (660.)
In Lem Moon Sing v. United States37 the Supreme Court re-
fused to interfere with an administrative decision denying the
right of a Chinese who had left this country for a short trip to
rednter the United States. Mr. Justice Harlan in delivering the
opinion of the Court said that a person "cannot, by reason
merely of his domicil in the United States for purposes of busi-
ness, demand that his claim to reenter this country by virtue of
some statute or treaty, shall be determined ultimately, if not in
the first instance, by the courts of the United States, rather
than exclusively and finally, in every instance, by executive
officers." (548.) The Supreme Court has also accepted as final
the decisions of the immigration officials denying the right of an
35 142 U. S. 651.
3626 Stat. 1084 (1891), Ch. 551.
37 158 U. S. 538 (1895).
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alien claiming to be in transit to a foreign country to land in the
United States on the ground that the journey was only pre-
tended and was, therefore, a ruse for entering this country for
the purpose of staying here.38
The first case in which there was presented to the Supreme
Court the question whether immigration authorities should pass
finally on the right to enter this country of one claiming Amer-
ican citizenship was that of United States v. Sing Tuck.39 It
happened that Sing Tuck had not exhausted the possibilities of
administrative relief by appealing to the Secretary of Commerce
and Labor4 o from the adverse decision of an immigration in-
spector; so the Supreme Court evaded the question by declaring
that "before the courts can be called upon, the preliminary sift-
ing process provided by the statutes must be gone through."
(170.) But the question was squarely raised in the case of
United States v. Ju Toy.41 The Supreme Court held that the
Act of August 18, 1894,42 provided that administrative officials
should pass finally on the right of one claiming to be a citizen to
enter the United States and that the act was not unconstitutional.
Administrative Deportation Order Final Unless Citizenship
Claimed. It is also well settled that the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
was not violated when Congress made final the decision of the
Secretary of Labor in proceedings to deport aliens from this
country.43 The Supreme Court has held, however, in the case
of Ng Fung Ho v. White44 that the decision of the Secretary of
Labor in a deportation case is not final when a claim of Amer-
ican citizenship has been made and supported by some sub-
stantial evidence. The Court said that the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment prevents the deportation of one claiming
38 Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296 (1902) ; Lee Gon Yung
v. United States, 185 U. S. 306 (1902).
30 194 U. S. 161 (1904).
40 In 1903 the control of immigration was transferred from the Treas-
ury Department to the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor.
32 Stat. 826 (1903), Sec. 4. When the Department of Labor was estab-
lished in 1913, it was given complete control over the admission of aliens.
37 Stat. 737 (1913), Sec. 3.
41 198 U. S. 253 (1905).
42 28 Stat. 372 (1895), Ch. 301.
43 Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 (1912) ; Lai To Hong v. Ebey, 25 F.
(2d) 714 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
44 259 U. S. 276 (1922). This decision was followed in Lew Shee v.
Nagle, 7 F. (2d) 367 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
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to be a citizen without the safeguards afforded by judicial pro-
ceedings. (284-285.) The decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of United States v. Ju Toy is still law, 45 but it is prac-
tically impossible to suggest any rational distinction between a
proceeding to determine whether one claiming American citizen-
ship shall be permitted to enter the United States and a proceed-
ing to determine whether one making a similar claim shall be
permitted to remain in this country.
No Right to Court Trial When Alleged Citizen Has Entered
Country Surreptitiously. A person who has entered the United
States surreptitiously should be in no better position than one
who has presented himself at the border for examination. When
a person who has entered this country surreptitiously is held
for deportation, he is not, therefore, entitled to a judicial deter-
mination of his right to remain here although he makes a claim
of American citizenship. 46
When Administrative Exclusion and Deportation Orders Are
Not Final. There are well defined limitations on the finality of
administrative decisions in exclusion and deportation cases. One
of these limitations is that the rule of finality applies only to
administrative decisions of questions of fact and does not extend
to administrative decisions on matters of law.47 Another limi-
tation is that the requirements of due process of law must be
observed in the administrative proceedings. The first of these
requirements is a fair hearing. The general rule is that the
hearing need not be conducted in accordance with the procedure
and rules of evidence followed in courts of law.48 There is, how-
ever, a clear split of authority as to whether hearsay evidence
is admissible. 49 In order to give the interested party an oppor-
45 Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U. S. 352 (1927).
46 Jung See v. Nash, 4 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925). Contra, Chin
Hoy v. United States, 293 Fed. 750 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
47 Gonzales v. Williawms, 192 U. S. 1 (1904); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3
(1915).
48 Mok Nuey Tau v. White, 244 Fed. 742 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); United
States ex rel. Di Battista v. Hughes, 299 Fed. 99 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924) ; John-
son v. Koch Shing, 3 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924); Dong Ying Fun v.
Nagle, 5 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); Moy Said Ching v. Tillinghast,
21 F. (2d) 810 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927).
49 Such evidence was held properly admitted in In re Jem Yuen, 188
Fed. 350 (D. Mass., 1910); Morrell v. Baker, 270 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2d,
1920); Moy Yoke Shue v. Johnson, 290 Fed. 621 (D. Mass., 1923); and in
United States ex rel. Smith v. Curran, 12 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
The use of such evidence was held to have amounted to a denial of a fair
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tunity to explain or rebut adverse testimony, it is held that the
administrative decisions must be based solely on evidence pro-
duced at the hearing.50 Under the statutes and under the rules
of the Department of Labor an applicant for admission to this
country has no right to be represented by counsel at the hearing
before a board of special inquiry.5 1
A denial of a fair hearing in either exclusion or deportation
cases can be established by showing a violation of the rules
established by the Department of Labor for such proceedings. 52
A denial of a fair hearing can also be established by proof of
prejudice on the part of the officials who conducted the hearing.53
A second requirement of due process of law closely allied with
that of a fair hearing is that the decision of the administrative
officials must not be arbitrary, i. e., without any substantial
support in the evidence. 54 The federal courts will not, however,
give relief from one of these administrative decisions merely
because it is against the weight of the evidence.55
hearing in Ex parte Radivoeff, 278 Fed. 227 (D. Mont., 1922); Ungar v.
Seaman, 4 F. (2d) 80 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); and in Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F.
(2d) 835 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
5o Ex parte Keisuki Sata et al., 215 Fed. 173 (N. D. Cal., 1924); Whit-
field v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); McDonald v. Siu Tak
Sam, 225 Fed. 710 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); In re Chan Foo Lin, 243 Fed. 137
(C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Chew Hoy Quong v. White, 249 Fed. 869 (C. C. A.
9th, 1918); Lewis ex rel. Lai Thuey Lem v. Johnson, 16 F. (2d) 180 (C.
C. A. 1st, 1926).
51 United States ex rel. Buceino v. Williams, 190 Fed. 897 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y., 1911); United States ex rel. Falco v. Williams, 191 Fed. 1001 (C. C.
S. D. N. Y., 1911); Brownlow v Miers, 28 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
52 Ex parte Radivoeif, 278 Fed. 227 (D. Mont., 1922) ; Sibray v. United
States ex rel. Plichta, 282 Fed. 795 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); United States ex
rel. Chin FooL' Wak v. Dunton, 288 Fed. 959 (S. D. N. Y., 1923).
53 Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833 (D. Mass., 1915); Ex parte
Lee Dung Moo, 230 Fed. 746 (N. D. Cal., 1916).
54 Ex parte Lam Pui, 217 Fed. 456 (E. D. N. C., 1914); Ex parte Wong
Foo, 230 Fed. 534 (N. D. Cal., 1916); Chan Kam v. United States, 232 Fed.
855 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916); Ong Chew Lung v. Burnett, 232 Fed. 853 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1916); Wong Yee Toon v. Stump, 233 Fed. 194 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916);
Chr issikos v. Commissioner of Immigration, 3 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 2d,
1924); United States ex rel. Mantler v. Commissioner of Immigration, 3
F. (2d) 234 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Ex parte Chung Thet Poy, 13 F. (2d)
262 (D. Mass., 1926), affirnied in 16 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927); Til-
linghast v. Wong Wing, 33 F. (2d) 290 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928); Wong Tsic,
Wye v Nagle, 33 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
55 Ex parte Chin Doe Tung, 236 Fed. 1017 (W. D. Wash. 1916) ; White
v. Fong Gin Gee, 265 Fed. 600 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920); Ng Hin FooL v. John-
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Court Trial on Merits if Administrative Action Objectionable.
If it is once established that an immigration or deportation hear-
ing was unfair or that the decision was arbitrary, the courts
may decide the issue on its merits.56 They will usually do so
when a person prejudiced by an improper exclusion order makes
a claim of American citizenship. 57 Some cases hold that when
there has been a denial of a fair hearing in immigration or
deportation proceedings not involving a claim of citizenship the
court should not render a decision on the merits, but should
make an order discharging the aggrieved person unless he is
given a fair hearing by the administrative officials within a
specified time from the date of the order.58 Such an order would
not prevent subsequent deportation proceedings if it did become
effective because it purposely leaves the merits undisposed of.
Administrative Order Not Res Judicata. While a proper ex-
clusion or deportation order has been made final by the statutes,
an administrative decision admitting a person to this country or
allowing him to remain here has not been made final.59 Such a
decision is not, therefore, a bar to a subsequent deportation pro-
ceeding because the principle of res judicata is not applied to
administrative decisions.60
son, 299 Fed. 618 (D. Mass., 1924); Damon ex rel. Lew Goon Wong v.
Johnson, 13 F. (2d) 284 (D. Mass., 1925), affirmed in 13 F. (2d) 285 (C.
C. A. 1st, 1926).
56 Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Sibray V.
United States ex rel. Plichta, 282 Fed. 795 (C. 0. A. 3d, 1922).
57 Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908); In re Chan Foo Lin,
243 Fed. 137 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454
(1920); United States ex rel. Chin Fook Wah v. Dunton, 288 Fed. 959
(S. D. N. Y., 1923); Lewis ex rel. Lai Thuey Lem v. Johnson, 16 F. (2d)
180 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926). Contra, White v. Wong Quen Luck, 243 Fed.
547 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
58 United States v. Petkos, 214 Fed. 978 (C. C. A. 1st, 1914); Ex parte
Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833 (D. Mass., 1915); Tod v. Waldman, 266 U. S.
113 (1924).
59 The decisions under the immigration statute are set forth in note 3
on page 12, supra. The same reasoning applies to the provisions of the
deportation statute discussed on pages 12 and 13, supra.
60 Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 281 (1906); Ex parte Stancampiano,
161 Fed. 164 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1908); Lim Jew v. United States, 196
Fed. 736 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912).
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CONCLUSION
Private Rights Protected by Courts Against Unjust Adminis-
trative Action. The federal courts have welcomed the relief
which the system of executive justice has brought to their con-
gested dockets, but they have been unwilling to increase such
relief by surrendering their well established right to examine
into the legality of executive action. To the declaration by Con-
gress that an administrative decision denying the right to use
the mails or the right to enter, or stay in, this country shall be
final, the federal courts have, therefore, added the limitations
that only an administrative decision on a question of fact can be
made final and that such a decision is final only when there has
been a fair hearing and the decision is supported by some sub-
stantial evidence.
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